



At the beginning of The Ideology of the Aesthetic Terry Eagleton
admits that he is not a philosopher.1 A severe critic of this book will
be inclined to jUdge the thinking it contains very unsatisfactory. It is
commonly loose, vague, superficial, prone to cliche and empty rhetoric,
schematic, inconsistent, reductive, and, apparently, more concerned
with political correctness than with truth. The kind of discussion that
Eagleton gives to the philosophers that he offers to consider is not
uniform: in the case of some he engages quite closely with their
views, and seems genuinely interested in what they have to say; in
the case of others, he seems to dismiss their views sarcastically as
merely the reflections of social or economic circumstances. Marxists
have always considered political interventions in the form of writing
or composition as operating at different levels: at one extreme there
is theory with pretensions to scientificity; at the other extreme there
are slogans for chanting at rallies or for storming the barricades; in
between come pamphlets, newspaper articles and leaflets. Marxists
are supposed, like eighteenth-century poets, to suit their discourse to
the context of its composition. By this standard Eagleton has committed
a sin against decorum. The Ideology of the Aesthetic is a pamphlet,
masquerading as theory. But, four hundred and fifteen pages is too
long for a pamphlet.
Ideology: An Introduction is superior to The Ideology of the
Aesthetic.2 It is argumentative, and frequently perceptive, and its
rhetoric is that of racy and colourful illustration, not the flamboyant
legerdemain of the former book. Nonetheless, even Ideology: An
Introduction is not adequately theoretical. It still evinces a tendency
to lump together things which should be kept separate, and it often
fails to explore thoroughly connections which ought to be made.
Even though Eagleton is manifestly thinking about his topic, he
seems mesmerised by conceptual counters that have gained the
status of heresies in the Marxist tradition: economism, historicism,
humanism, empiricism, idealism, essentialism, and so forth. Instead
of subjecting these to a theoretical critique, he erects them in his
mind as barriers, delimiting the area in which he may move. Generally,
he does not attempt to organize systematically the observations and
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deductions he makes about his topic. If The Ideology of the Aesthetic
is a pamphlet, Ideology: An Introduction is a series of essays, rambling
at leisure through the country explored by the 'ideologists' and their
critics, and treating us en route to a wealth of insights that a man of
wit, sensibility, sense and learning-and a political activist, to boot-
is capable of providing. But if, in The Ideology of the Aesthetic, it is
impossible to pin Eagleton down to anything very definite, in Ideology:
An Introduction it is all too easy to pin him down to any number of
positions. TIle problem is that one does not know how they are all to
be related to one another. Ideology: An Introduction is, in short,
eclectic.
In this paper I am not, on the whole, concerned with the adequacy
of Eagleton's interpretations of the various thinkers from Baumgarten
and De Tracy to Habermas and Lacleau and Mouffe with whom he is
concerned. What I wish to do is to clarify just what Eagleton offers to
perform in The Ideology of the Aesthetic, to analyse the difficulties
he gets into, and, by reference to Ideology: An Introduction, to
explain those difficulties as the result of Eagleton's trajectory as a
post-Althusserian Marxist. Eagleton's difficulties are, in their own
way, symptomatic of the general crisis of Marxism, not just in practice,
but in theory.
To what sort of inquiry is Eagleton offering to contribute in The
Ideology of the Aesthetic? Well, it certainly isn't aesthetics, at least
not as that term is generally understood. It would not be unfair to say
that, generally, Eagleton displays no interest at all in the philosophy
of art and natural beauty, nor is he interested in the history of this
subject. He is, on the whole, not concerned with whether any aesthetic
doctrines are true, probable or even just illuminating. He is not
interested in the relation of such doctrines to works of art or objects
of beauty. What he is interested in is 'the aesthetic' as ideology: 'the
category of the aesthetic', he says, 'assumes the importance it does
in modem Europe because in speaking of art it speaks of ... other
matters too, which are at the heart of the middle class's struggle for
political hegemony.3 Exactly what this implies I will examine below.
For the moment I will only note that Eagleton finds the category of
the aesthetic politically ambiguous:
The aesthetic is at once ... the very secret prototype of human subjectivity
in early capitalist society, and a vision of human energies as radical ends
in themselves which is the implacable enemy of all dominative or
instrumentalist thought ... If it offers a generous utopian image of
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reconciliation between men and women at present divided from one
anolher, it also blocks and mystifies the real political movement towards
such historical community.4
Eagleton evidently sees himself as a moderate, taking up the middle
ground against both liberal humanists and other bourgeois thinkers,
who take the aesthetic at face value as a discourse about art and
beauty, and those on the political left who dismiss the aesthetic as
bourgeois ideology. For Eagleton bourgeois aesthetics is bourgeois
ideology, but it still retains some value; but not, apparently, as
aesthetics.
Before we go any further, we must ask: does Eagleton dismiss
aesthetics-as the theory of art and beauty-as a misconception, and
substitute the aesthetic as ideology as the only valid way of regarding
aesthetics? Or, does he accept aesthetics as theory in principle, and
only offer to examine it from another angle, viz. aesthetics as ideology?
It is difficult to answer this question with any certainty, and it looks
as though Eagleton has not made up his mind about it. On the one
hand, there are places where he refers to the possibility of a radical
aesthetics or a revolutionary aesthetics,5 and he praises Lukacs'
theory of realism as a contribution to Marxist 'criticism'.6 On the
other hand, throughout the book he generally ignores the question
whether any of the aesthetic doctrines that he is expounding are true
or not. He certainly gives the impression that he regards the question
of their truth-value as of no importance. This impression is confirmed
by casual comments that the aesthetic has always secretly been the
political,7 and that the work of art is the 'type' of human autonomy
and hence 'politically charged',8 by the assumption that models of
the work of art are implicitly models of political organization,9 and
by the endorsement given to Benjamin's theory of allegory, in which,
apparently, anything can come to signify anything else.!O Benjamin's
theory seems to be the implicit justification for Eagleton's treating
aesthetic doctrines not as aesthetics but as ideological disguises for
other (social, political and sometimes ethical) interests.
If Eagleton thinks that aesthetics is not a theoretical concern in its
own right, he is wrong, and he is wrong in accordance with principles
that he himself acknowledges. He admits that the genetic fallacy is a
fallacy, that to ascribe to a doctrine its historical conditions is logically
distinct from assessing its truth-value.!! He also admits that an ideology
is not necessarily all falsehood, that ideological discourses can contain
true statements.!2 But, if he were to take these principles seriously,
he would be obliged to consider the substantive claims made about
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art and beauty by the philosophers, whose opinions he generally
tends, at least in tone and manner, to dismiss. I think it is not a
coincidence that Eagleton's attitude to aesthetics as theory is
ambiguous and obscure. Aesthetic philosophy is one of the aporias
of Eagleton's thought, one of those areas where his thinking is
baffled and frustrated by its own oppositions and contradictions.
This particular aporia is connected to his whole attitude towards
bourgeois philosophy, and what for him constitutes a Marxist critique
of thought. I shall return to this issue at the end of this paper.
The Aesthetic as Ideology
Eagleton is concerned with the aesthetic as ideology. We immediately
wish to know what he means by the terms, 'the aesthetic' and
'ideology'. What exactly is being connected here? To take 'the
aesthetic' first. The meaning that I have assumed so far-the
philosophy of art and beauty-is irrelevant. Eagleton is thinking
more specifically of concepts which he takes to be typical of the
whole range of aesthetic philosophies, concepts which designate
characteristically important areas for aesthetic thought to play upon,
or concerning which to make claims. In their verbal form as they
appear in Eagleton's text these concepts seem to be many. I will list
what I take to be the more important, as I have unsystematically
recorded them. The aesthetic may be said to pertain to: human
subjectivity; the body; sensation and perception; the affections or the
heart; sensibility; the work of art as an end in itself; self-determination;
the rich, all-round development of human capacities; the introjection
of abstract reason by the life of the senses; self-referentiality; the
mediation of sense and reason; the unity of subject and object; the
identity of content and form; the Imagination; spontaneous
understanding; spontaneous feeling; disinterestedness; the lived
dimension of sensory experience; the reconciliation of sense and
spirit; the unification of reason and sensuous pleasure; pleasure;
the unity of discipline and spontaneity; giving the law to oneself;
sclf-actualisation; social harmony; self-creation; being an end in
oneself; delight in oneself; self-hegemony; bringing form out of chaos;
custom, habitus and the social unconscious; semblance, meaning,
error, deception, simulation, delusion, self-delusion; play, dream, myth,
scene, symbol, fantasy, representation; bodily sensations and
imaginings inherently significatory and symbolic and inseparable from
figure and fantasy; the harmony of the particular and the universal;
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and the whole which is the interrelations of its partS. 13 (The obvious
comment on all this is that aesthetics clearly shares common interests
with other forms of thought; Eagleton would say that that is exactly
his point; however, such a response would only be a half-truth.)
Now for ideology. Ideology is variously described as: involving
the introjection of the law; encoding emotive attitudes relevant to the
reproduction of social power; involving performative discourse;
involving universal subjective responses; mystification and
legitimation; involving the identity of subject and object; feeling at
home in the world; thought which conceals its limits by etemalization
and universalization; being a matter of sensuous representation;
being primarily a matter of feeling; felt certainty; being incarnated in
everyday life; both pertaining to feeling and requiring social practices;
mediating between the affective and the practical; being a matter of
signs, images and representations; involving the semiotic mark of an
erased violence; self-delusion; being at home in the world. 14 (All
these notions associated with ideology or the ideological come from
The Ideology of the Aesthetic. In Ideology: An Introduction, chapter
one, we are given sixteen definitions of ideology, which are
subsequently reduced to six; in chapter two we are given a further
three definitions of ideology, and six definitions of what are called
ideological strategies. In addition, there are innumerable further
formulations of ideology throughout that book.)
In The Ideology of the Aesthetic Eagleton does not offer to explain
how all these meanings and associations of the term, 'the aesthetic',
and all these meanings of 'ideology' are related to one another;
which makes it a rather confusing book to read. The meanings of 'the
aesthetic'-most of them---can be reduced to three, which in tum can
be shown to be related to one another. The three meanings are:
(i) pertaining to the body, sensibility, feelings and imagination
(ii) giving the law to oneself
(iii) being an end in itself
(i) organizes all those concepts which set the body over against the
mind, or the sensibility, feelings or imagination over against reason.
(ii) organizes all those concepts that concern the mediation of reason
and the non-rational (the sensuous, the affective, the imaginary, the
bodily), especially in so far as this mediation is seen as an informing
of the non-rational by the rational (whether as law or understanding).
(iii) organizes all those concepts that have to do with self-realisation,
self-creation, self-determination and the unity of subject and object in
which it is assumed that the self or subject is the end in view of the
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process designated by the concept. These three meanings or concepts
can now be related to one another in the order: (i), (ii), (iii). That is to
say, we begin with (i) by positing the non-rational (the sensuous,
affective, bodily, etc); we move to (ii) in which we posit the informing
of the non-rational by the rational; and we then see (ii) as an essential
component of (iii), in so far as (iii) is taken to deal with human
subjectivity. Thus, introjecting the law of reason within the non-
rational side of human nature is seen as an essential component of
human self-determination, self-realisation, subjecthood. This is why
at the beginning of The Ideology of the Aesthetic Eagleton says,
'what emerges ... in the late eighteenth century is the curious idea of
the work of art as a kind of subject' ,15 and why he says, in a passage I
have already quoted, 'the aesthetic is ... the very secret prototype of
human subjectivity in early capitalist society, and a vision of human
energies as radical ends in themselves'. 16
The situation with all the meanings of the term 'ideology' is more
complicated, because some of the meanings are primary and some
secondary. The primary meanings can again be reduced to three,
which in turn can be related to one other:
(i) pertaining to sensuousness or feeling
(ii) pertaining to the introjection of the law
(iii) pertaining to the reproduction of social power
These can now be related in the movement, (i), (ii), (iii). We first
posit human sensuousness, and affectivity, the non-rational side of
human nature; we move to (ii), the introjection of the law within
this non-rational side of human nature; and then we see this process
in the context of and necessary to (iii), the reproduction of social
power. We now have what is essentially Louis Althusser's theory
of ideology, a theory of the constitution of human subjectivity by
which human beings become subjected to the system of social power
in which they are to live by being constituted as apparently
autonomous subjects freely obeying the laws that they have
introjected.J7 (All the other meanings of 'ideology' are secondary in
that they refer to contingent processes which mayor may not be
involved in the general ideological constitution and reconstitution
of human subjectivity (e.g. mystification, legitimation, etc) or to the
result of that process of constituting human subjectivity, viz. feeling
or being at home in the world.)
It will now be obvious why Eagleton wishes to see 'the aesthetic'
as ideology: 'the aesthetic' designates symbolically the constitution
of human subjectivity by certain processes; 'ideology' designates at
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the level of theory the constitution of human subjectivity by exactly
the same processes in the interest of the reproduction of social power.
In other words, 'the aesthetic' gives us two thirds of what is covered
by the term 'ideology', but it gives it to us as symbol or image or
type, whereas the theory of ideology gives it all to us as theory. 'The
aesthetic' is an oblique, symbolical discourse waiting to be translated
into scientific knowledge by Louis Althusser, or rather by Terry
Eagleton in Althusserian mode. 18
This is the place to emphasise something which is implied by this
account of Eagleton's project, and which is crucial. The aesthetic is
not just an ideology. There have been various ideologies in history,
for example, Christianity, chivalry, the doctrine of laisser-faire,
fascism, etc. The aesthetic is not co-ordinate with all these, it is not
just another ideology to add to the list. It is rather a symbol, image or
type of ideology itself, of what it is (according to Althusser) for
anything to be ideological. It is the symbolic equivalent of the abstract
concept of ideology.
I flatter myself that I have explained all this a good deal more
clearly than Eagleton does. In The Ideology of the Aesthetic he works
out this (let us say) analogy between the aesthetic and ideology in an
extremely confusing manner. The thesis cannot be explored
methodically from the standpoint of theory, because Eagleton is
committed to arranging his material historically. As a result we pass
from one conjunction of the aesthetic and ideology to another
conjunction, in which the terms mean something different, to a third
in which they mean something different again, and so on. Sometimes
the terms repeat themselves, but not in any apparent order. It is as
though we had two networks of flashing lights, one called the Aesthetic
and the other called Ideology. At any given moment a light will be
flashing on each network, but to any observer the order in which the
lights flash, and the pairings between them, will be incomprehensihle.
Excursus on Historical Materialism and the History of Ideas
There is one aspect of Eagleton's thesis which deserves special
mention: viz. the relationship he postulates between the aesthetic and
the fact/value problem. Eagleton sees the philosophical prohlem of
the disjunction between facts and values as arising from the transition
from pre-bourgeois to bourgeois society. Briefly, as society makes
this transition, values-norms, duties, goals--cease to be customary
or to be seen simply as the will of God. They become free-floating,
13
The Sydney Society ofLiterature and Aesthetics
and philosophers search for some way of grounding them in reality,
or else, like Hume and his descendants, insist on the impossibility
of so grounding them. Eagleton suggests that the two most popular
ways of dealing with this problem are to assert either that values are .
ends in themselves, or that values are founded in sensibility, feeling
or intuition. And Eagleton notes that these ways of characterising
values are analogous to the ways in which aesthetic philosophy
during the same period has characterised the work of art. On the basis
of this analogy Eagleton suggests that a problem in ethics has been
'aestheticized' (why the concepts of being an end in itself, and of
being founded in sensibility or intuition should be considered as
essentially aesthetic, such that they bestow an aesthetic character on
any other concepts with which they come into relation, is not clear;
but I will return to this matter later). 19
This issue of the aestheticization of the fact /value problem
provides a useful occasion for assessing the merit of Eagleton's kind
of discussion. What Eagleton is offering is an historical-materialist
explanation for the origin of certain ideas widely disseminated through
society, a Marxist history of ideas. In this particular case, the grounding
of the ideas in historically specific social conditions seems to me
convincing, so far as it goes. The unreflective habit of taking for
granted a value as custom, and the reflective habit of associating
values with the will of God really were undermined (though not
totally abolished) by the development of a modern contractually-
based society, and by the retreat of Christianity before the liberal-
rationalist currents of thought of the Enlightenment. Moreover, as
Eagleton explains, during the same period the work of art was
dissociated from specific social functions (those of religious worship,
glorification of the state, patronage, etc) and became a commodity to
be bought and sold on the market. In these conditions, it becomes
possible to reflect upon the work of art as something that does not
receive its value from religion, the state, one's patron, etc., and to
theorise that value in some other way, the obvious ways being that
either the work of art is an end in itself, since we no longer use it for
anything else, or that its value is related to our feelings about it, since
our possession of it essentially involves enjoyment.
But what Eagleton seems not to recognize is that to see a problem
in the matrix of its historical conditions is not to dissolve the problem.
As the doctrine of the genetic fallacy, suitably varied, states: to
ascribe to a problem its historical conditions is logically distinct from
solving the problem. In the case of the fact/value problem Eagleton
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writes as though the problem is just an illusion, a figment that will
disappear with the transition to a communist society. Similarly, for
him the problem of aesthetic value is just a mystified form of the
general problem of value, and of no independent theoretical interest.
Eagleton treats both these problems as merely historical and
sociological phenomena. In this respect, Eagleton's book is very old-
fashioned 'vulgar Marxism'. It refuses to recognize that some human
activities that are not economic or political have any interest in their
own right, or any essential character of their own. It reduces those
activities to the symptoms or passive effects of the socio-economic
base of society and/or its political superstructure, and its procedure is
to translate whatever is aesthetic, or religious, or moral, or
philosophical into terms that are either economic or political (this
does not imply that all statements made by aestheticians, priests,
moralists and philosophers can be taken at face value).
The Two Halves of Eagleton's Project
So far I have only dealt with one half of Eagleton's project in The
Ideology of the Aesthetic, that is, the examination of eighteenth- and
early nineteenth-century aesthetics as ideology (in the way that I
have explained above). The other half of Eaglcton's project is to trace
the development of what may be called 'aestheticized philosophies',
especially the philosophies of ethics and politics. The first half of
The Ideology of the Aesthetic is concerned with the aesthetic as
ideology, whereas the second half of the book is mainly concerned
with these aestheticized philosophies (the chapters on Benjamin
and Adorno complicate the situation even more by seeming to treat
radical aesthetics as aesthetics, and not just as ideology). The confused
reader is compelled to ask, how are these two interests related to each
other? There is, unfortunately, more than one answer to this question.
One answer is that some of these aestheticized philosophies, those
of Schopenhauer, Nietzsche and Heidegger, are also aestheticized
ideologies, by which I mean that they are philosophies of 'life' or of
experience which can act as ideology (in Althusser's sense) by offering
a world view that can constitute someone's subjectivity right down
to the roots of their lived experience. Because they involve lived
experience, subjectivity, senSibility, etc, etc, Eagleton sees them as
'aestheticized'. A second answer to the question is that some of
these aestheticized philosophies are, in Eagleton's view, materialist,
and take their starting-point, according to him, in the human body
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(Schopenhauer, Marx, Nietzsche, Freud, Heidegger), and since, as
we know, the aesthetic is associated with the human body, this is
another reason for thinking of these philosophies as aestheticized.
But, neither of these reasons, nor both of them together, is what really
holds the book together. And here we come to a curiosity in the
structure of this book. The Ideology of the Aesthetic, like any other
book, has to be read forwards, but it has to be understood backwards.
The secret of The Ideology of the Aesthetic is in the last chapter.
Eagleton's starting-point is the displacement of Marxism in the
academy by post-structuralism and post-modernism. He sees this as
involving the aestheticization of ethics and politics, and the
production of a cult of style, surfaces, pleasure and technique.20 He
takes Foucault as the proponent of an aestheticized ethics, derived
from Nietzsche's, which endorses an aristocratic cultivation of personal
excellence, a self-production by means of self-discipline, self-
realisation by the introjection of the law.21 And this ethics displaces
politics: 'society is just an assemblage of autonomous self-disciplining
agents, with no sense that their self-realisation might flourish within
the bonds of mutuality' .22 Lyotard is taken as the proponent of an
aestheticized politics, aestheticized in the sense that Lyotard grounds
politics in intuition, which Eagleton evidently identifies with
sensibility. And with this politics goes a rejection of totalizing grand
narratives such as Marxism, and the endorsement of a bland pluralism,
which is indistinguishable from liberalism.23 It is clear that Eagleton
organizes his understanding of what Foucault and Lyotard represent
by means of the basic conceptions that he has inherited from
Althusser's theory of ideology, the conceptions of sensuousness and
sensibility, of the introjection of the law, and of the constitution of
subjectivity. By means of these notions he can interpret post-
structuralism and post-modernism as the latest phase in a history of
the relationship between aesthetics and ideology that extends back to
the beginnings of bourgeois. society. Post-structuralism and post-
modernism are to be 'placed' in a Marxist pcrspective on thc
development of capitalism. Or, to use post-structuralist terminology,
Eagleton is offering to write the genealogy of post-structuralism and
post-modernism. This involves Eagleton looking at those philosophies
which are the ancestors of post-structuralism (Heidegger, Freud,
Nietzsche, and behind Freud, Schopenhauer; Eagleton also traces
some connections bctwccn post-structuralism and the Frankfurt
School); it also involves his looking at eighteenth- and nineteenth-
century aesthetics in order to establish the ideological connection
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between aesthetics and bourgeois society, and in order to give
the term, 'aesthetic', all the meanings he associates with ideology,
for without those meanings it will be impossible to describe the
life-philosophies of Schopenhauer, Nietzsche et al. as 'aestheticized'
philosophies.
The fundamental problem with this procedure is that none of the
concepts that Eagleton wishes to use is essentially aesthetic. Many of
them belong to the organicist mode of thought, and so originate in
nature-philosophy. They are part of the general nineteenth-century
revolt against the mechanical. Others of Eagleton's concepts belong
to ethics, metaphysics or epistemology. Eagleton wishes to suggest
that in the bourgeois period aesthetics has provided the model for
ethics and politics. The relationship is in truth the very opposite. In
the development of modern aesthetics philosophers have had to draw
on concepts which are either common to all sorts of inquiries (like
form and content) or which originate in more systematically developed
branches of philosophy (sensation and perception, sense and reason,
ends and means, freedom and necessity, subject and object, etc.). It
now becomes obvious that the connection that Eagleton establishes
between 'the aesthetic' and 'ideology' is no more than a tautology:
the concept of end-in-itself when used in aesthetics is identical with
the concept of end-in-itself when used in the theory of ideology.
Well, it certainly is. And so, Eagleton's offer to find the secret of the
aesthetic in ideology, or the secret of ideology in bourgeois society
in the aesthetic, turns out to be an empty rhetorical gesture. The issue
of the book's merit must turn upon two things: the cogency of the
historical explanations of the social origins of ideas, and the quality
of the critical commentary on the aestheticized philosophies. I will
merely say that generally the historical explanations are unconvincing
(some of them are so crude as to be ridiculous), and that the criticism
offered of the acstheticized philosophies seems to me perfunctory.
Eagleton's Problems
To view Eagleton's motive in writing The Ideology of the Aesthetic
as a desire to reaffirm Marxism against post-structuralism and post-
modernism is too simple. Marxism itself for Eagleton has become
problematical. Thedeficiencics of the Second International led to
historicist and humanist Marxism; the deficiencies of historicist and
humanist Marxism led to structuralist Marxism; the deficiencies of
structuralist Marxism have now produced the phenomenon of 'post-
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Marxism' .24 And it is of no use, apparently, going back behind the
Second International to Marx's own writings, since, as Eagleton offers
to show, some of Marx's most important ideas have themselves
become problematicaI.25 Eagleton is trying to fight an enemy with an
army so badly damaged as to be on the point of collapse.
Beneath the post-structuralist, radical feminist and deconstructionist
jargon the core of Eagleton's thought is still located within the
problematics of Louis Althusser's structuralist Marxism. But
Althusser's theoretical reformulation of Marxism, especially its theory
of ideology, has now become profoundly problematical for Eagleton.
It would not be too much to say that it is a trap that all through these
books he is struggling to get out of. And behind Althusser there is
the even more problematical figure of Freud. Eagleton is generally
thought of as a Marxist, but I should like to suggest that Freud's
thought has a far more powerful influence on Eagleton than Marx's.
The problems are these. The concept of the human subject is
ambiguous. It can denote either a free autonomous individual, or (as
in Althusser's thought) an individual that has been subjected to an
external ideological power so that it is constituted as an apparently
free but really dominated subjcct. AIthusser accepts the general validity
of Freud's theory of the unconscious, and sees the unconscious
processes of infancy as intertwined with the ideological processing of
society, as understood according to his own theory of ideology.26
Eagleton develops this hint by connecting Freud's theory of the
development of the ego and the superego with the processes of
ideological subjection. The formation of the superego is the process
by which the law of society is introjected within the affective side of
the human subjcct.27 But, this combination of Freudian ego-psychology
and Althusserian theory of ideology makes it very difficult to explain
how human subjects can either rationally criticise the ideological
view of the world that has been imposed upon them, or find the desire
to rebel against a social order to which their ideological processing
has subjected them. Behind these problems there lies the ambiguity
of a materialist philosophy of the body: on the one hand, the body
with its desires and pleasures can be seen positively as the site of
freedom and happiness against the oppressive tendencies of an
instrumentalist reason; on the other hand, it can be seen negatively as
an irrational, anarchic and dominating power standing over against
the impotent human self as its terrible Other. Eagleton does not




His ways of struggling to get out of this trap are many, various
and incoherent. Remaining within Althusser's problematic, he posits
that the ideological processing of individuals is contradictory, that
individuals are constituted both as passive, obedient subjects, and as
free autonomous subjects. With Lacan Eagleton posits a relative
autonomy of human desire, such that total subjection never quite
takes place. With the late Freud Eagleton holds that the good moral
values of mutuality, gratitude, love, etc. are grounded in the socio-
biological relationship of infant and adult (how this notion is to be
related to the rest of Freud's thought which is causing the problem is
unclear). With Norman Geras Eagleton asserts that Marx had a theory
of general human nature and basic needs, which presumably are to
provide the stimulus to an understanding of and resistance to alienation.
With Habermas Eagleton posits an essential rationality implicit in the
processes of human communication. With Gramsci Eagleton finds
that the consciousness of the exploited classes is a mixture of what
comes to them from the ideas of the ruling class and what is derived
from their own experience. Finally, Eagleton adduces the evidence of
rape-crisis centres and picket-lines to prove that, well, people do
actually resist oppression.28 In brief Eagleton has no solution to his
problem, and this is disguised by the fact that he has any number of
solutions to his problem.
Beneath the problem with Althusser, beneath the problem with
Freud, beneath the problem with materialism in general, there is
an even more basic problem with Marxism: on the one side Marxism
threatens to collapse into liberalism; on the other side Marxism
threatens to collapse into post-structuralism. By this I mean that
Marxism shares certain notions with the liberal humanism that
Eagleton wishes to reject (e.g. positivism, humanism, a classical
doctrine of truth), and other notions with the post-structuralism
that Eagleton also wishes to reject (a rejection of the concept of
disinterestedness, a tendency to regard ideas as the effects of
unconscious motivations). How to preserve reason and theory without
lapsing into positivism? How to preserve objective truth without
lapsing into liberal-minded disinterestedness? How to preserve
interestedness without lapsing into aestheticized egoism? How to
preserve desire without abandoning Marx for Nietzsche? Eagleton
is out of his depth with these problems because he is not a theoretical
thinker. It is commonplace in Marxist epistemology to oppose
dialectical thinking to eclecticism. Eagleton is undoubtedly an
eclectic. I said earlier that Eagleton's attitude to aesthetics as theory
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is ambiguous and obscure, and that aesthetics is an aporia in
Eagleton's thought. It is so, because it concentrates his problems
within itself, problems of truth, interest and desire. In part of his mind
he wishes to reject bourgeois aesthetics as just bourgeois ideology.
In another part of his mind he is struggling to preserve common-
sense notions of truth, objectivity and knowledge. But, if he followed
out the implications of this realism-tendency, it would take him back
towards a realist theory of art such as Luk~cs espoused. and this
would require him to make a rather more serious dialectical critique
of bourgeois aesthetics as aesthetics. At present, his subjugation to
Louis Althusser and structuralist Marxism is apparently holding him
back from this.
Eagleton, and other Marxists generally, have a great deal of thinking
to do.
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